

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

4 July 1954

De-Briefing of [ ]

1. Departed LINCOLN 15 February 1954 for FJHOPEFUL, arriving there on 16 February where he reported to [ ] Then [ ] and [ ] inspected materials on hand and set up original packaging station.
2. Materials on hand at FJHOPEFUL consisted of approximately 175,000 lbs., including rifles, ammo, both 9mm and 7.62, pistols, 20 mm cannons, hand grenades and a few miscellaneous items. These materials were sterilized, cleaned and placed in fireable order before packaging ~~xxx~~ for caching, or advance shipment to the front. Personnel arrived at latter part of February to assist in packaging preparation of these materials.
3. During this period approximately 250,000 lbs of equipment was received, including mortars, 47 mm and ammo, 9 mm and 7.62 ammo, rifles, sub-machine guns, LMG, hand grenades, fragmentation and concussion, TNT, demolition charges (shaped). Also included rations, medical supplies, equipment, parachutes and other miscellaneous items which were to be included in the kits as prescribed by LINCOLN. All these materials were opened, inspected and sterilized if needed for further shipment or packaging. Packaging of these items were for caching which consisted of cleaning and oiling all fireable weapons, wrapping in cloth, sewing in burlap and dipping in tar, the tar acting as the preservative for burial purposes. At the height of the operation there were approximately 12 people, including [ ] to inspect, package and wrap the above-mentioned materials and load aircraft leaving FJHOPEFUL for WSHOOFS.
4. Other work included the supervision of tying down these loads as well as the distribution of materials to each area. During this time we were steadily receiving more supplies and equipment for SHERWOOD which was also dispatched to their respective destination. Also at this time approximately 6 or 7 C-124's were unloaded which brought the above mentioned 200,000 lbs. of equipment into FJHOPEFUL. This entailed working anywhere from 12-18 hours, 7-days a week, for the full crew of men there.
5. The packaging of material was completed around the first part of April, at which time the first 3 men of the packaging crew were released to return to PEPRIME and each week thereafter 3 men were released until 31 May, at which date the last 3 men left FJHOPEFUL. During this time [ ] acted as Chief Assistant in supervision and packaging, loading and unloading and tying down aircraft loads. During the stay at FJHOPEFUL approximately 275,000 -300,000 lbs of materials were shipped to WSHOOFS and other destinations. Approximately

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30,000 lbs communications gear was shipped to SHERWOOD for setting up their station.

6. On 2 June orders came through to move to SOMERSET, the advance base for purpose of dispatching bundles and supplies to the troops, also making up of new drop bundles to meet requirements from LINCOLN. [ ] and [ ] proceeded to Somerset, arriving there the night of 2 June, at which time they remained for 2 days with the KMFLUSH troops at the local air base. They reported in to BRODFROST, and were given the assignment of preparing 50 new air drop bundles consisting of rifles and ammo, in addition to the 115 bundles on hand. During this time shipments were received of supplies and equipment from FJHOPEFUL, and they supervised the unloading and its storage at Somerset.
7. On approximately 16 June first flight took off from Somerset with 9 bundles. Prior to this first flight the crews and kickers, both indigenous and PBPRIME had been given several preliminary flights for familiarization with kicking of bundles and behavior of the aircraft, this being under the supervision of [ ] For the next 8 days there was loading and unloading of aircraft because of lack of reception parties in the DZs which ran ~~xxx~~ until approximately 21 June at which time signals were received from the ground to drop.
8. Upon arrival of the P-47 fighters a job of armor was placed on [ ] and [ ] as well as the other work on the cargo ships, this work consisted of arming 50 cal. machine guns and loading ammo for same, fusing and racking bombs of 250#, 500# GP and 260# and 120#(6 - 20# bombs clusters) fragmentation bombs at which time some difficulty arose as to the detonation of the bombs, believed to have been from the arming and wiring of same. It was found that bombs were fused properly, all equipment was checked; afterwards results were favorable. At this time [ ] and [ ] wired the safety and arming wires to the fusilage of the airplanes making sure that if the bombs were dropped they would explode or would be known to be positively a dud. During this time results were 100% detonations.
9. Upon the arrival of the bomb expert, all bombs/ racks, firing selenoids were checked, arming procedures were checked and found to be correct. After checking each pilot out on a cockpit check no more trouble occurred.

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10. During this time, being rather short-handed, [ ] and [ ] worked approximately 23 hours a day, working both cargo and fighter planes to keep them flying. On approximately 30 June the cease-fire came into effect at which time our operations came to a very abrupt halt. The KMFLUSH govt placed an armed guard on all aircraft and supply buildings and PBPRIME personnel were not allowed to go near the aircraft or take any supplies or materials other than a few personal effects from the warehouse. This ban was lifted on 1 July at which time the evacuation of Somerset took place in the afternoon. Then the first shipload of mortar ammo which was left over departed Somerset with 3 passengers, namely

[ ] and the mortar expert. This left the final loading of the remaining 2 aircraft in the hands of [ ] and another man (Jim).

11. [ ] arrived at FJHOPEFUL at midnight 2 July and departed there 3 July, reporting to LINCOLN on 4 July.

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Comments

1. Complete support was received from FJHOPEFUL in the procurement of packaging materials and extra help from personnel assigned to that base. Support given by [ ] was a tremendous help in the procurement of materials, on short notice, that were needed for completion on packaging requirements.
2. It was found that the single wrap of muslin cloth was not sufficient to prevent some of the tar that penetrated the outer wrap of burlap from getting onto the weapons. The amount that penetrated was not enough in most cases to render the weapon unserviceable.
3. Received very good cooperation from the indigenous personnel of Somerset in loading and unloading aircraft there.
4. Cooperation and support of all branches of PBSUCCESS personnel at Somerset was exceptionally good.
5. The pilots and crews of the aircraft seemed to lack a sense of security as to discussions of flights, places they had been, also the work that they were doing. Several times it was necessary in public eating places to call their attention to the fact that they were not to talk of their activities in which they were engaged. This was observed most especially from the ~~the~~ crews as there was more contact with them than with the pilots.
  - A. The P-47 pilots were not familiar with the bombs, bomb releases of their aircraft, this being especially true of [ ]  
These two men had quite a bit of trouble with bombs that did not explode. It is believed that they were dropping them with the chemical release and not arming them. [ ] was very aggressive in his actions and runs, very truthful in targets hits or missed and probably has a better record of this operation on hits and damage done than the other
  - 2.
  - B. The C-37 pilots were very much interested in the monetary returns received from their flights and drops as were their kickers.
  - C. The 4 indigenous kickers and one ground crew man were exceptionally good in their work. <sup>There</sup> ~~They~~ were very few complaints from these men, they worked hard and did the very best job that they could possibly do considering that there was a language barrier between them and the crew.